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FAMILY LAW 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER 
If this was not a year marked by the importance of decisions in family 
law, it was a year in which a large number of curious issues were raised 
and settled. This year provided answers to such questions as: whether a 
non-resident mother-in-law is a member of the family for purposes of the 
Family Court Act; whether an antenuptial agreement preceding an in­
cestuous marriage is enforceable and, indeed, whether antenuptial agree­
ments are enforceable at all because of anti-heart-balm legislation. Finally, 
a definitive position has been taken on a husband's duty of support for his 
wife's child conceived through artificial insemination. 
Marriage.-It has been evident for some time that the New York courts 
take a rather liberal view of the statutory provision declaring marriages 
between uncle and niece void_ While it is clear that such a marriage validly 
contracted elsewhere in the United States would be recognized in New 
York,1 it was equally clear until this year that such a marriage contracted 
in New York was, by operation of statute, void.2 A decision this year cast 
some doubt on the latter rule. In Matter of Estate of Saffer,S the court held 
an antenuptial agreement made prior to such a "marriage" in New York 
State to be valid and enforceable. Since the validity of an agreement of 
this sort depends on the validity of the proposed marriage, the court sug­
gested that the parties might have gone out of the state to consummate a 
valid marriage at any time in the future. The difficulty with this position, 
in light of other cases holding an antenuptial agreement void when based 
on a proposed bigamous marriage, is that, on the death of the first 
spouse, it would be equally possible to effect a valid marriage. Alternatively, 
it would be possible to obtain a divorce and then remarry. In point of fact, 
in any case, the marriage would be void when contracted. 
The case is in rather sharp contrast to another case which this year 
assaulted the enforceability of antenuptial agreements generally.4 
Marital Property.-The extent of the wife's ownership of property 
connected with the marriage still raises a considerable problem. For ex­
ample, consider joint bank accounts which, undoubtedly, are often opened 
without serious consideration of the extent of interest in the fund by 
husband and wife. ·When ownership of the fund is disputed, however, it is 
di�tributed in accordance with the intention of the person who made the 
George J. Alexander is Assistant Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College 
of Law and a Member of the Illinois and New York Bars. 
1. Matter of Estate of May, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953). 
2. Audley v. Audley, 196 App. Div. 103, 187 N.Y. Supp. 652 (1st Dep't 1921). 
3. 39 Misc. 2d 691, 241 N.Y.S.2d 681 (SUIT. Ct., Kings Co. 1963). 
4. Wasserman v. Weisner, 36 Misc. 2d 916, 234 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962). 
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deposit. Consequently, a wife is entitled to half of a joint account, even 
if the husband has since withdrawn the entire fund, unless he can over­
come the presumed intention of making a gift of one-half by the deposit.1S 
The wife must also litigate the issue since the presumption is clearly 
rebuttable.6 
Even more difficult is the question of intention in the purchase of house­
hold goods which are primarily useful in furnishing the marital home. 
Here, it is even more difficult to look to the intention of the parties as a 
means of determining property interests since their likely intention was 
to use the property jointly during their marriage. Faced with this problem, 
one court has given each a one-half interest.7 To further complicate the 
matter, the husband is apparently entitled to immediate possession of his 
property, even if it is a part of the marital residence, when he no longer 
chooses to live with his wife. Indeed, this is true even when he wrongfully 
abandons her.s In the interim between the abandonment and a court order 
determining property rights and the extent of the duty of support, this 
conclusion may leave a wife in an embarrassing position. 
Paternity.-Few cases in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence have grappled 
with the difficult problem of the paternity of a child born of artificial 
insemination. New York has two such cases as of this year. Unfortunately, 
they are diametrically opposed in theory. The case decided this year, 
Gursky v. Gursky,9 refused the status of a legitimate child to an infant so 
born, although it held the husband of the inseminated liable for the 
child's support because of the husband's consent. In refusing the argument 
that the child was entitled to support as a legitimate child of the marriage, 
the case flies in the face of the other instance in which a judicial determin­
ation of the status of such a child was made. In Strnad v. Strnad,tO the 
court was asked to decide the right of visitation to be accorded the 
husband who had consented to his wife's artificial insemination. The 
court stated that the child was a legitimate child of the marriage. Not 
finding this theory applicable on any of the grounds on which court legitima­
tion may occur nor on any quasi-adoption theory urged by the prior court, 
the court, in the Gursky case, found the rationale erroneous. It pointed out 
that both legitimation and adoption are matters governed solely by statute 
and that, consequently, the court has no power to initiate new theories of 
legitimation. Certainly, the law provides no present answers, unless they 
can be derived through court construction, for the status of a child born of 
artificial insemination. 
5. Russo v. Russo, 17 App. Div. 2d 129, 232 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1st Dep't 1962). 
6. Florio v. Florio, 19 App. Div. 2d 526, 240 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1st Dep't 1963). 
7. Tausik v. Tausik, 38 Misc. 2d 11, 235 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962). 
8. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 17 App. Div. 2d 106, 232 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1st Dep't 1962). 
9. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1963). 
10. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1948). 
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The onus of illegitimacy remains as strong as ever. As at common law, 
a court within this year has held than an illegitimate child is no-one's 
child.ll The court found that the Welfare Department may not charge a 
father with liability for support of his daughter's illegitimate child, al­
though he is liable for her support and would presumably be liable as a 
grandparent for the child's support were it legitimate.12 The case not only 
is contra to another holding under a similar statutel3 but may be unsup­
portable in theory as well. ,\Vhatever purpose the legislature had in allow­
ing welfare indemnification would seem to support the right to indemnifica­
tion in the case of illegitimate children. A broad reinvocation of the filius 
nullius doctrine now may wash over into other contacts where the re­
sults fall on less affluent risk bearers. 
Under what circumstances may a married woman bring paternity pro­
ceedings against a person not her husband? Under the Domestic Relations 
Law, the answer was simple: A paternity action could be brought if the 
child was born out of wedlock.14 That, in turn, required either that the 
child be begotten and born out of wedlock or that the mother have been 
separated from her husband by court order or for a period of one year 
prior to the birth of the child.I5 If neither of these conditions applied, no 
action would lie.16 A court this year reiterated the rule.17 Under the 
present Family Court Act, however, the result is far from clear.18 Gone are 
the provisions allowing an action based on judicial separation and those 
making reference to a year's absence of the husband. A child is born out 
of wedlock now only if he is born and begotten out of lawful matrimony. 
If the old rationale applies and the section is still taken as governing, it 
would seem that no paternity action would ever lie if the mother was 
married. The result seems peculiar when one considers the retention of 
the provision allowing husband and wife to testify to non-access in 
paternity proceedings.19 
In any event, what does one do under either statute when the child is 
wnceived while the wife is married to a man who is not the father, and 
born at a time when she has married the father? Following the analysis 
suggested above, and conceivably also under the prior Domestic Relations 
I I .  McManus Y. Lollar, 36 Misc. 2d 1046, 235 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962). 
12. N.Y. Soc. WeI. Law § 101 includes grandparent among those responsible. Cf. 
Calhoun Y. Calhoun, 256 App. Diy. 672, 11 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dep't 1939). 
13. Jones Y. Jones, 161 Misc. 660, 292 N.Y. Supp. 221 (N.Y. Dom. ReI. Ct. 1937) 
(illegitimate child is "stepchild" for similar support liability). 
14. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1925, ro. 225, § I; repealed, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 690. 
15. Id. at § 119. 
16. Matter of "Dunn," 203 Misc. 181, 115 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Child. Ct., Onondaga Co. 
1952), aU'd, 281 App. Diy. 1068, 121 N.Y.S,2d 766 (4th Dep't 1953) (no paternity proceeding 
though blood test excluded husband's paternity). 
17. Lovelace v. A.rcieri, 17 App. Div. 2d 465, 235 N.Y.S.2d 501 (3d Dep't 1962). 18. See N.Y. Famlly Ct. Act art. 5. 
19. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 531. 
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Law,20 the child was legitimate as to the first husband and not the subject 
of a paternity proceeding against the second. A court, however, had little 
difficulty in holding the second husband to be the father.21 The policy 
serving legitimation of children does not require an opposite result. None­
theless, it would seem that in this area legislative clarification would be 
appropriate. 
The law has always required a rather high standard of proof to estab­
lish paternity. The concept of protecting putative fathers, apparently 
underlying the proof requirement, has gone unchallenged. Only rarely, 
however, does one get a chance to review the factual standards which 
actually apply. One such case came up this year, suggesting the possibility 
that the standard may not be as vigorous in practice as in pronouncement. 
In Lozano v. Platt,22 the appellate division reversed a lower court determina­
tion of paternity. The dissenting justice found occasion to review the 
evidence which he believed supported paternity: Petitioner bought mer­
chandise where the respondent worked. She was ably to identify the type of 
car respondent drove although wrong about its color. She alleged inter­
course. 
Separation, Support and Alimony.-It may be that the courts this 
year have created a level of separation below both the level of absolute 
divorce and divorce from bed and board. It has always been reasonably 
clear that, absent proof of one of the statutory grounds for separation, a 
spouse is not entitled to a legal separation from the other spouse.23 How­
ever, pending their reconciliation and their ability to "live happily ever 
after,"24 the parties may remain apart.25 What was unclear until this year 
was whether a court could immunize a party, who removed himself from 
the marital residence, from a decree of separation based on his abandon­
ment despite an inability to find grounds for separation. Gladstone v. 
Gladstone26 did just that. It found that, while the wife had not established 
her right to a judicial separation based on cruelty and inadequate support, 
the husband had not established his counterclaim based, in part, on 
abandonment. The court concluded that the wife had proved enough to 
estblish her right to live separately from her husband but not enough to 
prove her right to a judicial separation. Presumably, having proved her 
right to live separately the �ife is now immunized from a later suit based 
on abandonment. If this is true, then it is submitted that the parties are 
20. It is not clear from the case whether the mother and her earlier husband 
cohabited when she became pregnant by the present husband. 
21. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 18 App. Div. 2d 932, 238 N.Y.S.2d 349 (2d Dep't 1963). 
22. 18 App. Div. 2d 1071, 239 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st Dep't 1963). 
23. See Brighton v. Brighton, 38 Misc. 2d 479, 237 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 
1963). 
24. Id. at 480, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 598. 
25. Ibid. 
26. 35 Misc. 2d 206, 232 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962). 
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as adequately judicially separated as if a decree of separation had issued 
except, of course, that the financial aspects of this settlement are different. 
On the related problem of separation agreements, the usual number of 
cases found their way into court. Drafting proved, as in prior years, to be 
one of the important stumbling blocks. Thus, in a dispute over a provision 
to provide for the education of both Peter and Stephen the sum of twenty 
dollars per week and for Richard the sum of ten dollars per week until 
each shall attain the age of twenty-one, a court found that the agreement 
unambiguously provided for the payment of fifty dollars per week rather 
than the husband's contended thirty dollars.27 
Surviving the chasm of drafting, a separation agreement must hurdle 
the illegality provision embodied in Section 51 of the Domestic Relations 
Law.::!8 This year the hurdle was raised. For one thing, a court held that the 
parties may not agree to have the wife supported out of a portion of a 
personal injury recovery not yet obtained, as such a provision (when the 
exclusive provision for support) contravenes the husband's duty to provide 
support for the wife.29 'Whatever merit there may be in allowing the wife 
to attack such an agreement on these grounds, it is not clear why the 
husband, having recovered in his personal injury action, should be able 
to set up the "illegality" of the agreement as a defense. It should be noted, 
however, that there were other grounds for the decision. 
An even stranger application of the prohibition against contractually 
removing the husband's duty to support arose in Lacks v. Lacks.30 In that 
case, the Court of Appeals seemed to invalidate a reconciliation support 
agreement, which provided handsomely for the wife, on the grounds that 
it affected the husband's duty of support at a time when the parties were 
living together. In so doing, the Court managed to invoke a principal 
originally intended to keep husbands from financially inducing separation 
in such a manner as to prevent husbands from financially inducing 
reconciliation.31 
Furthermore, the perennial problem of contracting to obtain a divorce 
through a separation agreement received what may be a harsher treatment 
than had been provided for many years. In Viles v. Viles,32 the separation 
agreement entered into by the parties, and presumably entirely valid on 
its face, was invalidated by the court on the ground that the negotiations 
leading to it included the factor of the wife's obtaining a divorce. Ac­
tually, there were two separation agreements. The first one, after the parties 
become estranged, called for a level of support for less than half a year and 
'27. Tremper v. Tremper, 35 Misc. 2d 846, 231 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 
196'2). 
28. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 51. 
'29. Taylor v. Taylor, 36 Misc. 2d 747, 233 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962). 
30. 12 N.Y.2d 268, 189 N.E.2d 487, 238 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1963). 
31. See Comment, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 681 (1963). 
32. 36 Misc. 2d 731, 233 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962). 
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an agreement on long range plans thereafter. The parties lived apart. 
When the initial period of support expired, the husband agreed to pay a 
somewhat higher level of support. Significantly, the husband also made a 
payment designed to pay for the wife's trip to the Virgin Islands where 
she proposed to obtain a divorce. Thereafter, she obtained the divorce. 
The court in this action allowed the husband to repudiate the agreement. 
If this case stands for the proposition that the husband's agreeing to pay 
the expenses of the divorce constitutes a violation of Section 51 of the 
Domestic Relations Law, or if it stands for the proposition that an agree· 
ment to make increased support payments when the parties decide to di· 
vorce is invalid, then it seems doubtful that many separation agreements 
can survive court challenge. It should be remembered that the parties in 
the instant case, unlike many other persons who have litigated their 
separation agreements, had already separated and had, indeed, lived apart 
for several months under an agreement which clearly did not envisage a 
permanent separation. Having thereupon decided that their marriage 
could not be saved, they contracted for a permanent support provision and 
the wife went abroad for her divorce. It seems difficult on these facts to 
find more of a taint in the agreement than that which normally accompa­
nies separation agreements coupled with a party's divorce. 
Where no separation agreement existed, the question of the extent of 
the husband's duty to support was also the subject of the usual amount 
of litigation. During this year a new provision in Section 51 of the Domestic 
Relations Law became effective.s3 By clear implication, a wife might now, 
under appropriate circumstances, be required to support her husband. No 
case has as yet applied that provision. Wives were, however, in for their 
share of judicial castigation. In refusing to increase alimony in one case, 
the court made it clear that it had less than complete sympathy with the 
petitioner's wife who, the court indicated, was now having trouble holding 
her fifth husband.s4 In another case, the appellate division reduced even 
temporary alimony against a wealthy man, in part because of a history of 
prior marriages and the fact that the marriage on which the alimony order 
had been based had only lasted a few months.s5 Another court, finding 
itself disenchanted with the wife's claim, awarded her nothing when she 
sought support payments following an annulment.so Finding that she had 
a job and that there were no children, the court held that she might well 
fend for herself. 
Of course, not all husbands were appealing either, and another court 
33. The gist of the provision is that husband and wife may not contract to rcmm'c 
the wife's obligation to support the husband under certain circumstances. N.Y. Dom. 
ReI. Law § 51. 
34. KesseIer v. KesseIer, 236 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1963). 
35. SaIzberger v. SaIzberger, 18 App. Div. 2d 991, 238 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1st Dep't 1963). 
36. Fleck v. Fleck, 237 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1963). 
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took an opportunity to berate, at some length, the "playboy" antic of a 
husband who was seeking to avoid alimony on his lack of employment. 
Needless to say, substantial alimony was awarded.37 
As in other years, appellate courts have had to review the excessive 
alimony granted by lower courts. Some instances arose in which the 
appellate court had difficulty finding enough left after alimony to allow for 
the husband's support. Such was the case in l'1ercier v. Mercier,3s where 
the husband, whose earnings were primarily limited to salaries of about 
521,500, was ordered to pay S16,000 per year to his wife. 
It has always been a matter of discretion with the trial court to 
determine the level of alimony appropriate to the circmstances. Conse­
quently, the range of considerations going into any given award are dif­
ficult to determine. At least one interesting consideration which may have 
some novelty in alimony cases was raised this year. One court, in setting 
the level of support in an application for increase from a prior alimony 
decree, considered that the husband was in a better position to pay an 
increased amount because he was living with another woman and claiming 
her as his wife on his income tax return, thereby effecting the benefits of 
a joint return.39 'Whether a comparable reduction will be allowed in the 
future, should the government press for back ta.xes based on these false 
returns, was not indicated. The same case has made another interesting 
contribution to the law in its suggestion that the increased cost of living is, 
by itself, a sufcient reason to increase alimony. The prior cases indicate 
that an alimony decree cannot be changed unless the condition of the 
parties changes. If an increase in the cost of living is a sufficient change in 
condition, it would seem that few alimony decrees have any permanency 
in a time of progressive inflation. 
Even setting the amount of alimony is, of course, not the final court 
action. Obtaining compliance with the decree is sometimes difficult. Jail 
is often an unpalatable alternative. A carefully reasoned opinion reviewed 
the advantages of payroll deductions from the husband's salary as an alter­
native means of accomplishing the collection goa1.40 
Afarriage Dissolution.-:Whatever may have been the case before, the 
courts this year seem to have become stricter with respect to annulments. 
Thus, a petitioner claiming to have been defrauded by a false claim of her 
spouse's wealth was admonished for her credulity and denied an annul­
ment.41 Even the usual unfulfilled promise to have children lost its ap­
proval under unexceptional facts.42 It was more heartily disapproved when 
37. Brandt v. Brandt, 36 Misc. 2d 901, 233 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962) 
($10,400 pcr annum). 
38. 18 App. Div. 2d 880, 237 N.Y.S.2d 428 (4th Dep't 1963). 
39. Damsey v. Damsey, 39 Misc. 2d 385, 240 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1963). 
40. "Doe" v. "Doe," 37 Misc. 2d 788, 234 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Family Ct., Bronx Co. 1962). 
41. Avery v. Avcry, 236 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962). 
42. Primmer v. Primmer, 37 Misc. 2d 589, 234 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 
1962). 
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urged after ten years of marriage.43 No more favorable response was 
achieved where the grounds were a breach of the promise to love and of a 
contract of support.44 
The effect of out-of-state divorces proved more consistent this year 
despite previously discussed infirmities.45 Alabama divorces seemed im­
mune from collateral attack. by a party before the Alabama court.46 An anal­
ogous situation arose with respect to a Virgin Island divorce in which the 
court refused to allow collateral attack. in the absence of a decision in the 
Virgin Islands on the propriety of such attack..47 
Mexican divorces have always raised problems of their own. Under 
appropriate circumstances, New York courts will respect such divorces on 
a comity principle, but this does not mean that they will be given the re­
spect accorded under the doctrines of res judicata or full faith and credit 
to a sister state decree. For example, mental derangement not rising to a 
rather stringent standard is an inappropriate defense to a New York di­
vorce action.48 Institutionalization of a woman for mental disease, how­
ever, may persuade a New York court to deny validity to a Mexican divorce 
when she denies the service of papers on her.49 When Mexican divorces 
are of the "mail order" variety, they are afforded no status at all.5o As a 
result, the New York decisions have been uniform in denying an injunc­
tion against obtaining such a divorce on the ground of its apparent in­
validity.51 However, this year saw a contrary result reached.52 The court 
found itself able to distinguish its case from those that preceded it on the 
ground that in prior cases the petitioner had achieved a separation order 
in New York prior to the other's invocation of the jurisdiction of the Mexi­
can court. Since the petitioner in the instant case had not achieved that 
status, the court found her more in need of its equitable power. It is pos­
sible that the result is more desirable than that achieved in the other cases 
since it allows an earlier declaration of the invalidity of the Mexican de­
cree. The distinction between it and the prior cases is, however, not very 
useful. If the Mexican decree is invalid, the status of New York litigation 
at the time that it is decreed would seem irrelevant. 
43. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 35 Misc. 2d 890, 231 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 
1962). 
44. Cantor v. Cantor, 234 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1962). 
45. See Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 333, 
334-36 (1962). 
46. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 18 App. Div. 2d 34, 238 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1st Dep't 1963); Sommer 
v. Sommer, 36 Mise. 2d 379, 232 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962); Greene v. Greene, 
236 N.Y.S.2d 732 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1963). 
47. Klarish v. KIarish, 19 App. Div. 2d 170, 241 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1st Dep't 1963). 
48. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 773, 236 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 
1962). See Comment, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 677 (1963). 
49. Donohue v. Donohue, 236 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co. 1962). 
50. Marum v. Marum, 8 App. Div. 2d 975, 190 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2d Dep't 1959). 
51. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955). 
52. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 39 Misc. 2d 471, 240 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct., Bronx 
Co. 1963). 
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Condonation was put in issue by a number of cases this year. Two 
cases seem to demonstrate the rule usually applied in separation cases: A 
short period of time of continued cohabitation and intercourse does not 
establish condonation53 while an extended period does.54 It was thought, 
however, that in a divorce action any continued cohabitation after knowl­
edge of adultery would invoke condonation to defeat the action. One case 
this year suggests the contrary.55 Continued cohabitation for a period of 
fifteen months during which the parties occupied the same bedroom was 
held insufficient for condonation, at least in the absence of intercourse be­
tween the parties. If the courts are attempting to encourage reconciliation, 
the rule seems highly desirable. 
Children.-Among the most important decisions concerning children 
were those relating to the respective rights to the custody of children by 
parents and by the state. One court ruled that the family court had power 
to "place" a child in a state institution if it felt her to be a "person in 
need of supervision," even if she had not committed an act which, if done 
by an adult, would constitute a crime.56 Thus, it appears that the loss of 
the power to "commit" to a state institution57 in such cases is largely a 
euphemistic change. Another court was equally clear, however, that the 
family court is at least a necessary intermediary.58 Thus, whatever the right 
of peace officers to apprehend a iuvenile, this right does not extend to his 
indefinite detention without a family court proceeding. 
Another difficult problem, long vexing the courts, has been the prob­
lem of the rights of the natural mother to a return of her child from 
others. Her relative power, where the child is being held by foster parents, 
has been previously examined.59 Her position vis-a.-vis an "authorized 
agency" or the "\Velfare Department has not been spelled out as thor­
oughly. In both cases, either by contract or statute, a mother normally 
agrees to a termination of her maternal rights by the initial placement.6o 
The cases suggest, however, that neither the contract nor the statute will 
be strictly followed in this respect, and that the determinative question 
will be the ability of the mother to provide a fit home for the child.61 It 
53. Fusaro v. Fusaro, 236 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.), 18 App. Div. 2d 714, 
237 N.Y.S.2d 989 (2d Dep't 1962). 
54. Takagi v. Takagi, 38 Misc. 2d 476, 237 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 1963). 
55. Miller v. Miller, 237 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962); 
56. Matter of "Doe," 36 Misc. 2d 611, 232 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962). 
57. The Family Court Act limits the permissible orders for persons in need of 
supervision to discharge, suspended judgment, probation and placement. N.Y. Family 
Ct. Act § 754. 
58. People ex reI. Johnson v. Michael, 39 Misc. 2d 365, 240 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct., 
N.Y. Co. 1963). 
59. See Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 333, 
34042 (1962). 
60. The authority for both types of relinquishment is N.Y. Soc. WeI. Law § 383. A 
common type of "contract" is contained in People v. Free Synogogue Child Adoption 
Comm., 194 Mise. 332, 85 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1949). 
61. See, e.g., People v. Free Synogogue Child Adoption Comm., supra note 60. 
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may be, however, that the fit home which she must provide will be judged 
on very demanding psychiatric standards.62 
In a year which was marked by an increased testing of Negro rights 
in many areas, family law was not exempt. In Rockefeller v. Nickerson,63 
the court was asked to intervene in a denial of a petition by white parents 
to adopt a Negro child. The petitioners alleged a 'Welfare Department 
policy to deny interracial adoption which the department denied. Finding 
sufficient basis for the denial as an exercise of discretion in the best inter­
ests of the child, and giving credence to the department's denial of a racial 
policy, the court avoided a holding on the question whether an adoption 
may be denied solely on a racial basis, although it did, by way of dictum, 
adopt an out-of-state case holding that it may not. It would be peculiar if, 
in a state in which a child must be placed with parents of its religious 
faith,64 and in which parent-child matching is attempted in fine detail on 
a number of other criteria, race were an insignificant distinction. An ap­
propriate resolution would seem to be not greater matching but an aban­
donment of the present requirement of religious matching in favor of the 
criterion adopted by this and other courts generally; that is, the best in­
terests of the child. 
The right of children to bring suit against their parents was as 
abridged this year as it was previously.65 Indeed, it may have become a bit 
more abridged by a holding that a child, who was adopted at the time of 
suit but not at the time of the tort, could not bring an action against his 
parents.66 Other children were barred in their suit against a foster father, 
not on the basis of the inter-familial tort immunity, but because of New 
York heart-balm legislation.67 These children were the donee beneficiaries 
of an antenuptial agreement made by their mother with her present hus­
band. As part of his obligation he had agreed to bestow certain favors on 
her children, among them a million dollar trust for each. VVhen he reneged, 
the children sued. The court found the agreement unenforceable, in part 
because it tended to alienate the children from their natural father whose 
support they renounced on discovering their claim to greater wealth. Pri­
marily, however, the court held the agreement to be in contravention of 
the New York statute against heart-balm actions. The reasoning appears 
to be that the failure to provide the support agreed on for the children 
was a breach of the antenuptial contract (although the marriage took 
place). The antenuptial contract was reduced to its basis, a contract for 
62. Mittenthal v. Dumpson, 37 Misc. 2d 502, 235 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Family Ct .• Bronx 
Co. 1962). See Comment, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 679 (1963). 
63. 36 Misc. 2d 869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962). 
64. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 1I3. 
65. See Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 333. 
342-43 (1962). 
66. Isabella v. Isabella, 19 App. Div. 2d 540, 240 N.Y.S.2d 945 (2d Dep't 1963). 
67. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 80-84. 
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marriage. Breach of a contract for marriage was not actionable because 
of the anti-heart balm legislation.68 One wonders, if this decision should 
prove correct, whether any suit can be brought on an antenuptial agree­
ment. 
The Family Court Act.-A year under the New York Family Court 
Act has apparently brought more questions than answers. Many problems 
remain to be resolved.G9 Perhaps one of the greatest problems, however, is 
the fact that the new family courts have not in all instances complied with 
the clear sections of the law designed to protect the rights of individuals. 
Unfortunately also, the appellate courts have not demanded a rigorous 
compliance with those aspects of the law but have dealt with the question 
of compliance in terms of the prejudice to the de£endant.70 It may well be 
that such rulings are more explainable in terms of the novelty of the act 
than of the ultimate position of the court. If not, however, many of the 
salutory provisions of the act will be swept away by the argument of lack 
of prejudice to the respondent. 
One of the most novel areas in the Family Court Act is the provision 
for family offense proceedings, which are apparently the civil counterpart 
for what would otherwise be criminal proceedings.71 Much remains to be 
discovered about these proceedings. A few answers, however, are available. 
For one thing, whatever the act may say with respect to the jurisdiction of 
the family court over assault generally,72 the supreme court has been quick 
to point out that its jurisdiction over a felony assault remains unchanged 
and that the family court has no jurisdiction in this area.73 This leaves 
misdemeanor assault to be handled by the family court for members of the 
family and raises the rather interesting question of who is a member of 
the family. 'What about a non-resident mother-in-law? One court gave her 
familial status.74 
68. Wasserman v. Weisner, 31'\ Misc. 2d 916, 234 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962). 
69. See Note, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 481 (1963). 
70. Fasolo v. Probation Dep't, 19 App. Div. 2d 775, 241 N.Y.S.2d 873 (4th Dep't 
1963) (mem.). 
71. N.Y. Family Ct. Act art. 8. 
72. "Any criminal complaint charging . . •  an assault between . . .  members of the 
same family • • .  shall be transferred by the criminal court . • •  to the family court • • • •  " 
N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 813. 
73. Ricapito v. People, 38 Misc. 2d 710, 238 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1963). 
74. People v. Keller, 37 Misc. 2d 122, 234 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Dist. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962). 
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